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Book Reviews I International Relations 
seemingly the most bullish, end up stressing constraints. 
For Nye, the problem is that the chief challenges of the 
day cannot be settled with the kind of capabilities in 
which the United States excels. Ikenberry insists that U.S. 
unipolar power can only be effective if it is bound by 
constraining multilateral rules. 
Events since these essays were written in late 2003 or 
early 2004 appear to buttress the consensus. The United 
States remains bogged down in Iraq and seems to be expe- 
riencing fiscal overstretch, and Secretary of State Condo- 
leeza Rice is busily seeking to reestablish Washington's 
multilateral credentials. It is nonetheless worth asking 
whether this turn of events actually vindicates the shared 
scholarly assessments contained in this book. Counterin- 
surgency has never been easy-neither for Russia in the 
nineteenth century, when it fought in the Caucasus for 
two generations, nor for the British in the Boer War, nor 
for all the other great powers, including the United States 
itself in the Philippines or Vietnam. America's difficulties 
in Iraq are important, but they hardly constitute evidence 
of something new about international relations that makes 
power especially powerless. Washington's fiscal overstretch, 
moreover, is fundamentally the result of domestic, not 
international, priorities, and the Bush administration's ew 
multilateralism ay tell us more about its troubles in Iraq 
than the binding power of multilateral rules. 
Are old-fashioned state-centric capabilities really as "pow- 
erless" as these authors suggest? They might be, but there 
are grounds for skepticism. The authors here generally 
follow the common practice of determining the utility of 
power by assessing active attempts by the United States to 
use it. This inevitably leads to selection bias against evi- 
dence of the indirect, "structural" effects that U.S. power 
may have on international ffairs that are not dependent 
upon active management. Things that do not happen-- 
counterbalancing, reat-power arms racing, hegemonic 
rivalry, security dilemmas among Asian powers, decisions 
by Japan and others to nuclearize, and so on-are as impor- 
tant as those that do. Not only are nonevents downplayed 
in comparison to salient events that appear to demon- 
strate the powerlessness of power, but patterns of events 
that do go the unipole's way are often missed. Washington's 
failure to have its way in the United Nations is featured; 
its quite different experience in the International Mon- 
etary Fund is not. And even in the United Nations, the 
focus on highly contested issues, such as the attempt at a 
second resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq, fails to 
note how the institution's whole agenda has shifted to 
address concerns (e.g., terrorism) that the United States 
particularly cares about. 
This is fine collection of essays that exemplifies the many 
different intellectual pathways to the conventional schol- 
arly wisdom about constraints on American power. Read- 
ers seeking a challenge to their views will likely have to 
look elsewhere. 
Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional 
Government Requires Sovereign States. By Jeremy A. 
Rabkin. Princeton: Princeton U iversity Press, 2005. 350p. $29.95. 
- Eric Posner, University of Chicago 
Many people complain that American foreign policy is 
self-interested, unilateralist, and brutish, and wish that 
the United States would participate more enthusiastically 
in multilateral institutions, uch as the United Nations, 
the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Treaty. 
Defenders of American foreign policy argue that these 
institutions just do not serve America's interest. Jeremy 
Rabkin offers an alternative version of this argument: He 
says that yielding sovereignty to global institutions vio- 
lates America's constitutional traditions, and the attractive 
mixture of freedom and security that these traditions sup- 
port. Global governance is bureaucratic, nsensitive todem- 
ocratic pressures, and indifferent to local variation in values 
and interests. Further, liberty requires the rule of law, and 
the rule of law can prevail only in a sovereign state. Global 
governance undermines sovereignty and thus undermines 
the rule of law and freedom as well. 
Rabkin has no objection to international law per se. So 
long as international law is created by the governments of 
sovereign states, which retain the option to violate or with- 
draw from treaties, itcan do much good. What he objects 
to is the transfer of loyalty of the general public, and 
important domestic institutions such as courts, from the 
constitutional government of the state to international 
institutions orvague international norms or standards that 
are advanced by busybody nongovernmental organiza- 
tions: "If the United States can be subject to the will of 
outside powers, it cannot be governed by the schemes 
ordained in the Constitution" (p. 266). Rabkin fears that 
Americans will be tempted to succumb to rule by the 
mainly foreign employees of international institutions 
because it promises ecurity, prosperity, and promotion of 
human rights; will become accustomed to such rule; and 
then will not realize until too late that they have lost the 
capacity to engage in self-government. And given that inter- 
national institutions coddle tyrants, appease aggressors, 
and impose elite values on the common people, Ameri- 
cans will realize too late that they have lost more than they 
have gained. 
Rabkin's b~te noir is the European Union, which is 
itself a quasi-international institution to which constitu- 
ent states have yielded some sovereignty. He attributes 
the viability of the EU to the dirigiste, bureaucratic, and 
aristocratic traditions of the Continent, and argues that 
the Europeans want to foist their idealistic ommitment 
to global governance on the Americans as well, whatever 
damage it might do to American democratic and consti- 
tutional values. Europeans might like the EU but that is 
because they discount the values of self-governance and 
freedom. For Americans, the EU shows what happens 
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when state sovereignty gives way to supranational 
institutions. 
The author raises important questions. Although some 
American legal scholars have raised constitutional con- 
cerns about American participation in certain inter- 
national institutions, their objections are narrowly legalistic, 
and could be silenced through constitutional mendment 
or (more likely) narrow interpretation of troublesome con- 
stitutional provisions by courts that tend to defer to the 
political branches' foreign policy. Rabkin, by contrast, 
appeals to American traditions and ideals that the Consti- 
tution, as currently understood, embodies. 
Ironically, Rabkin's argument echoes the worries of the 
early critics of the U.S. Constitution. These critics feared 
that the sovereignty of the former colonies would be lost 
to a distant, imperial national government, and with the 
loss of sovereignty would come the loss of prized tradi- 
tions of self-governance. These critics lost the battle in the 
1780s and were forever silenced by the Civil War. Amer- 
ican constitutional traditions celebrate freedom but they 
also embrace empire. Power, prosperity, and prestige were 
the benefits gained in return for yielding local self- 
government to a remote national elite. To be sure, the 
federalist system preserves local autonomy to some extent, 
but the final product is very much a compromise, and 
certainly permits further expansion if warranted by the 
gains. Advocates of global governance, as well as critics 
like Rabkin, can find ammunition for their views in Amer- 
ican constitutional traditions. 
Rabkin's argument thus depends less on American con- 
stitutional ideals than on a theory about the limits of 
lawmaking. The author thinks that only sovereign states 
can make and enforce laws that serve the interests of the 
people, and he appears to think that the size of sovereign 
states has a natural limit. When states become too 
large-at the extreme, a world state-they lose the power 
to enforce the law, and to the extent hat they can, they 
become imperial, bureaucratic, remote, soulless. But 
nobody today equates "global governance" and a world 
state. Rabkin argues, rather, that the intermediate insti- 
tutions advocated by supporters of global governance cre- 
ate, or are likely to lead to, global institutions that fall 
short of a world state but nonetheless are harmful in 
similar ways. 
The argument seems too extreme. Not even the Euro- 
peans want to extend the EU to the United States, China, 
and Indonesia. The international criminal court, the Kyoto 
Treaty, and the World Trade Organization do not impinge 
on sovereignty inthe way that the EU does. Rabkin fears 
that if Americans acquiesce in these forms of global gov- 
ernance today, they will acquiesce in an EU-like system 
tomorrow, but the idea that we should reject valuable inter- 
national institutions, ifthey are valuable, because of the 
remote chance that Americans will become complacent 
about global governance, in general, is not plausible. 
These criticisms a ide, Law Without Nations? has much 
value. Advocates of global governance often talk as though 
international institutions have only benefits and no costs, 
and opposition to them is irrational or purely self-interested. 
Rabkin draws attention to the moral and political costs of 
these institutions, and convincingly argues that more is at 
stake than their immediate consequences for foreign pol- 
icy. He is right that there are natural imits on the size of 
states, and that people who transfer their loyalties from 
national institutions tointernational institutions take grave 
risks with their freedom and well-being. Even if the Amer- 
ican and the European systems have worked well for their 
own citizens, it does not follow that these systems can be 
expanded beyond their current boundaries. 
Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and 
Peace Enforcement in the Balkans. By Brian Rathbun. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004. 242p. $39.95. 
- Alexandra Gheciu, University of Oxford 
Brian Rathbun's book is an important contribution atthe 
interface of international relations and comparative poli- 
tics, providing a fascinating, well-researched analysis of 
the impact of domestic politics on the formulation of for- 
eign and defense policy in three major European states: 
Great Britain, Germany, and France. Rathbun makes two 
key claims: Parties articulate and implement different pol- 
icies in the area of peace enforcement and European defense 
cooperation due to their different ideologies. Second, con- 
trary to the view that parties formulate policies to win 
elections, he argues that, in general, parties win elections 
to formulate policies. In an empirically rich account of 
the effects of partisan politics, Rathbun analyses the views 
of-and disagreements among-the main parties in the 
UK, France, and Germany regarding peace enforcement 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, and regarding the establishment of
an European Union capacity for carrying out peace enforce- 
ment operations. 
Rathbun argues that in contrast o parties on the right 
of the political spectrum, leftist parties believe less in the 
use of force, particularly for strategic purposes; have a 
more inclusive definition of national interest; and are more 
willing to rely on multilateral cooperation in pursuit of 
their goals. He notes that peace enforcement generates 
values conflicts, especially for leftist parties that are forced 
to choose between the peaceful resolution of conflicts and 
the protection of basic human rights abroad. When faced 
with such conflicts, he seeks to demonstrate, politicians 
support different policies depending on their positions on 
the ideological spectrum and their country's historical leg- 
acies in the area of armed conflict. 
Partisan Interventions successfully challenges the argu- 
ment, which for many years was seen as conventional 
wisdom in the field of international relations, that the 
national interest is an objective datum, unaffected by 
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